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## LETTER TO THE EDITOR

## Cryptography based on neural networks—analytical results

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### Abstract

The mutual learning process between two parity feed-forward networks with discrete and continuous weights is studied analytically, and we find that the number of steps required to achieve full synchronization between the two networks in the case of discrete weights is finite. The synchronization process is shown to be non-self-averaging and the analytical solution is based on random auxiliary variables. The learning time of an attacker that is trying to imitate one of the networks is examined analytically and is found to be much longer than the synchronization time. Analytical results are found to be in agreement with simulations.

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The study of neural networks was originally driven by its potential as a powerful learning and memory machine. Statistical mechanical methods have been used to analyse the network's ability and explore its limitations [1, 2]. In a recent paper [3], a bridge between the theory of neural networks and cryptography was established. It was shown numerically that two randomly initialized neural networks with one layer of hidden units (so-called parity machines (PMs)[4]) learning from each other, are able to synchronize. The two parties have common inputs and they exchange information about their output. In the case of disagreement, the two PMs are trained by the Hebbian learning rule on their mutual outputs and they develop a full synchronized state of their synaptic weights. This synchronization procedure can be used to construct an ephemeral key exchange protocol for the secure transmission of secret data. An attacker who knows the architecture of the two parties, the common inputs, and observes the mutual exchange of information, finds it difficult to imitate the moves of the parties and to reveal the common parameters after synchronization. All parties have secret information which is not known either to other members or to possible attackers: their initial weights and the current state of their hidden units are noted as internal representations (IRs).

In most applications a public-key system is used which is based on number theory where the keys are long integers, and the complexity of the encryption/decryption processes scales polynomially with the size of the key [5]. In this letter we present a cryptosystem which is

based on biological ideas including the network architecture, biological operations and the learning process, and the complexity of the generation of the secure channel is linear with the size of the network. This biological mechanism, which is shown analytically to be robust against a possible attack, may be used to construct an efficient encryption system using keys which change permanently.

During the last decade, the analysis of learning from examples performed by feed-forward multi-layered networks was exhaustively examined using statistical mechanical methods [1, 2]. The study of the generalization ability of such networks was based on a set of training examples generated by a static teacher network. Here we discuss a case where two or several multilayer networks are trained by their mutual outputs. This scenario has been solved only for perceptrons with continuous weights [6]. Here we present an analytic solution for PMs with continuous as well as with discrete weights.

In our cryptosystem, each party in the secure channel is represented by a feed-forward network consisting of  $KN$  random input elements  $x_{ji} = \pm 1$ ,  $j = 1, \dots, N$ ,  $K$  binary hidden units  $\tau_i = \pm 1$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, K$  and one binary output unit  $\sigma = \Pi_i \tau_i$ . For simplicity of calculations presented below we concentrate only on the case of a tree PM with three binary hidden units feeding a binary output  $\sigma = \tau_1 \tau_2 \tau_3$ . The hidden units are determined via Boolean functions  $\tau_i = \text{sgn}(\sum_j W_{ji} x_{ji})$  through three disjointed sets of inputs  $\mathbf{X}_i = x_{1i}, \dots, x_{Ni}$ . The weights are either discrete or continuous, and the analytical results are derived for  $N \gg 1$ .

In this letter we present: (a) an analytical solution of the mutual learning of two PMs whose weight-vectors are updated according to the mismatch between their mutual information—their outputs. Synchronization is achieved in the case of discrete weights,  $W_{ji} = 0, \pm 1, \dots, \pm L$ , as well as for continuous weights confined to a sphere,  $\sum_{j=1}^N W_{ji}^2 = N$ . (b) Analysis of online adaptation of discrete weights, in which each change of a component is not infinitesimally small, demands different methods than the standard ones [7], and this is at the centre of the discussion below. Surprisingly, synchronization is achieved for the discrete weights at a finite number of steps. (c) Dynamical evolution of the discrete networks cannot be characterized by the time evolution of the standard order parameters, since the overlaps between the weight-vectors are not self-averaging [8] even for large networks. The analytical solution is based on calculation of the evolution of the *distribution* of the order parameters as a function of the initial set of the weights. (d) The analysis is extended to include a possible attacker.

For simplicity of presentation, we first describe the analytical methods developed for the discrete case where detailed results are presented for particular examined cases. At the end of this letter results for the continuous case are also briefly summarized.

The definition of the updating procedure between the two parties,  $A$  and  $B$ , that are trying to synchronize their weights, is as follows. In each time step, the output of the two parties is calculated for a common random input. Only weights belonging to the one (or three) hidden units which are equal to their output unit are updated, in each of the two parties. The updating is done according to the following Hebbian learning rule,

$$\begin{aligned} W_{ji}^{A+} &= W_{ji}^A + K(W_{ji}^A x_{ji} \sigma^B) x_{ji} \sigma^B \theta(\sigma^A \tau_i^A) \theta(-\sigma^A \sigma^B) \\ W_{ji}^{B+} &= W_{ji}^B + K(W_{ji}^B x_{ji} \sigma^A) x_{ji} \sigma^A \theta(\sigma^B \tau_i^B) \theta(-\sigma^A \sigma^B) \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where  $K(y) = 1 - \delta_{L,y}$  and  $\delta$  represents the Kronecker function. The purpose of the operator  $K(y)$  is to prevent the increment (decrement) of the strength of the weights on the boundary value  $L(-L)$ .

Two important simulation results are crucial for the analytical description of the mutual dynamics. The first observation is that the synchronization time is finite [3]. The second is that different runs (set of random inputs) of the above dynamics, but with fixed initial conditions for the two parties, result in different sets of IRs. As a result of these two observations, we

realized that the variance of the overlaps between the two parties is finite and does not shrink to zero even in the thermodynamic limit. This unusual scenario of online mutual learning is taken into consideration in the analytical equations, by the selection of random IRs following the freedom given by the current analytical overlaps. We find an iterative discrete set of equations for the mutual overlaps between the parties, whose evolution depends on some random but correlated ingredients—the current IRs,  $\{\tau_i^A\}$ ,  $\{\tau_i^B\}$  (see equation (1)).

In each time step,  $\mu$ , the mutual state of the two parties is defined by a  $(2L + 1) \times (2L + 1)$  matrix,  $\overline{F^i}(\mu)$ , where  $i$  represents the hidden unit. The element  $f_{qr}^i$  of the matrix stands for the fraction of components in the  $i$ th weight-vector which is equal to  $q(r)$  in the first(second) party, where  $q, r = 0, \pm 1, \dots, \pm L$ . The overlap of the weights belonging to the  $i$ th hidden unit in the two parties,  $R_i^{A,B} = \mathbf{W}_i^A \cdot \mathbf{W}_i^B / N$ , as well as their norms,  $Q_i = \mathbf{W}_i \cdot \mathbf{W}_i / N$ , are given by the matrix elements

$$R_i^{A,B} = \sum_{q,r} qr f_{qr}^i \quad Q_i^A = \sum_{q,r} q^2 f_{qr}^i \quad Q_i^B = \sum_{q,r} r^2 f_{qr}^i. \quad (2)$$

These overlaps and norms fixed the probabilities of deriving the same IR via the normalized overlap,  $\rho_i^{A,B} = R_i^{A,B} / \sqrt{Q_i^A Q_i^B}$ . More precisely, the probability of having different results in the  $i$ th hidden unit of the two parties is given by the well-known generalization error for the perceptron  $\epsilon_p^i = \cos^{-1} \rho_i / \pi$  [1, 2].

Each of the PMs consists of a tree architecture and for random inputs each of the eight IRs appears with equal probability. The joint probability distribution of the 64 different pairs of IRs in both parties is correlated, and can be explicitly expressed using  $\{\epsilon_p^i\}$ .


The development of the elements of the matrix  $\overline{F^i}(\mu)$  is calculated directly from equation (1), where one has to average over the inputs  $x_{ij}$ . We use auxiliary random variables in order to choose one of the possible IRs following their probabilities given by  $\{\epsilon_p^i\}$ . In each step we choose two sets of random numbers which are taken from a flat distribution between 0 and 1: set I: In the event that the number is smaller than  $\epsilon_i$  we deduce that the two hidden units disagree, otherwise we assume an agreement. Set II: All eight IRs are equally probable in the first party, since the architecture consists of a tree PM. We choose one among the eight using the second set of auxiliary variables  $p_r$ , and the corresponding IR for the second network according to the first set.

To exemplify derivation of the iterative equations for  $\{f_{qr}^i\}$ , let us concentrate on the case where the result of the first random set is that all three hidden units are in disagreement. In two possibilities out of the eight IRs all three hidden units are updated, whereas in the other six possibilities only one is updated (we then have to choose at random one among the three). After taking into account all possible internal scenarios, and accordingly the updates, one can show that the iterative equations for  $\{f_{qr}^i\}$  away from the boundary,  $q, r \neq \pm L$ , are given by

$$f_{q,r}^{i+} = \theta \left( \frac{1}{4} - p_r \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} f_{q+1,r-1}^i + \frac{1}{2} f_{q-1,r+1}^i \right) \\ + \theta \left( \frac{i+1}{4} - p_r \right) \theta \left( p_r - \frac{i}{4} \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} f_{q+1,r-1}^i + \frac{1}{2} f_{q-1,r+1}^i \right).$$

On the boundary, similar equations can be derived as well as for other internal scenarios. Taking into account all possible scenarios and the inversion symmetry of our PMs, one has to solve iteratively only four classes of equations in a manner similar to the above-mentioned [9].

Different runs for updating the equations result in different trajectories of the order parameters. In the inset of figure 1, we present the average overlap  $\overline{\rho} = \sum_{i=1}^3 \rho_i / 3$ , and its standard deviation, obtained from 500 different runs of the analytical equations with  $L = 1$ .



**Figure 1.** The histogram of the  $t_{\text{synch}}$  (solid line) and  $t_{\text{learn}}$  (dashed line) as was obtained in different runs of the discrete iterative equations for PMs with  $L = 1$ . Symbols stand for simulation results,  $N = 10\,000$  and  $500$  runs. Inset: numerical results of  $\bar{\rho}$  as a function of the number of steps. Analytical results (solid line) and simulation results (circles) include the standard deviation obtained from 500 different runs.

Results of the averaged overlap (with similar standard deviation) obtained in 500 runs of simulations with  $N = 10^4$  are denoted by circles.

An important quantity is the number of steps required to achieve full synchronization,  $t_{\text{synch}}$ , since it can be used by the parties to encrypt/decrypt the information using the known output bit. In simulations the synchronization time is well defined—the first step in which all weight-vectors of the parties are in an anti-parallel state. In contrast, in the analytical solution the average overlap of the hidden units tends to zero exponentially with the number of steps. In order to compare analytical results to simulations we need to find a criterion which determines synchronization. We chose the criterion  $\bar{\rho} \leq -c_l = -1 + 0.1/(NL)$  to define full synchronization, since  $c_l$  is much greater than the maximal possible overlap just before synchronization.

The exponential decay of the overlaps with the number of steps and the claim that synchronization is achieved at a finite number of steps even for  $N \gg 1$  have to be clarified. Our synchronization process is mainly characterized by two regimes: the first  $t_a$  steps which are characterized by different IRs (in some of the steps) for the two parties. Note that  $t_a$  is fluctuating from sample to sample. The asymptotic regime, the last  $t_b$  steps, where the IRs of the parties are always the same, and the weights are converging to an anti-parallel state similar to three perceptrons,  $t_b \propto \log(N)$  [9]. Roughly speaking, the two regimes are characterized by  $\epsilon_i^P > 1/t_a$  and  $\epsilon_i^P < 1/t_b$ , respectively. Our analytical results as well as simulations indicate that  $t_a$  is independent of  $N$ . Hence as long as  $t_a > t_b$ , the  $\log(N)$  dependent is invisible. For  $L = 3$ , for instance,  $t_{\text{synch}} \sim 400$ ,  $t_a \sim 300$ , and  $t_b$  is expected to be equal to  $t_a$  only for  $N \sim e^{200}$ .

In figure 1, we present the histogram of the number of steps required to achieve  $t_{\text{synch}}$ ,  $P(t_{\text{synch}})$ , in simulations with  $N = 10^4$  and  $L = 1$  and the initial weights were chosen such that  $\rho_i^{A,B} = 0$ . This distribution is in fairly good agreement with the results obtained by the runs of the iterative equations for  $\{f_{qr}\}$ .

Let us now examine a possible attack of a third player, an attacker  $o$ , that tries to imitate one of the parties (let us say  $A$ ). We assume that the attacker uses the same algorithm as one

**Table 1.** The average synchronization time,  $t_{\text{synch}}$ , the average learning time,  $t_{\text{learn}}$ , their standard deviation and the ratio  $t_{\text{learn}}/t_{\text{synch}}$  averaged over 2000 different runs of the iterative equations with the halting criterion  $c_l = 1-10^{-5}$ .

	$t_{\text{synch}}$	$t_{\text{learn}}$	$r$
$L = 1$	$61 \pm 10$	$1.1 \times 10^2 \pm 0.2 \times 10^2$	$1.8 \pm 0.6$
$L = 2$	$188 \pm 26$	$1.5 \times 10^3 \pm 0.5 \times 10^3$	$8.0 \pm 2.9$
$L = 3$	$376 \pm 51$	$4.5 \times 10^4 \pm 1.3 \times 10^4$	$120 \pm 51$
$L = 4$	$673 \pm 95$	$6.9 \times 10^7 \pm 5.7 \times 10^7$	$1.04 \times 10^5 \pm 1.02 \times 10^5$

of the partners. The attacker updates its own weight-vectors only when an updating step is taken by the parties. The natural move of an attacker in such an event is to follow the rule of the parties

$$W_{ji}^{o+} = W_{ji}^o + K(W_{ji}^o x_{ji} \sigma^B) x_{ji} \sigma^B \theta(\sigma^A \tau_i^o) \theta(-\sigma^A \sigma^B) \quad (3)$$


indicating that only weight-vectors belonging to the hidden units which are in agreement with the output of party  $A$  are updated. The evolution of the overlap of an attacker depends on the evolution of six matrices; three matrices describing the overlaps between the parties and similarly, three matrices describing the overlaps between the attacker and the first party. Note that the dynamics of the attacker depends on the moves of the parties which depend on their overlaps. Hence, the time evolution of six matrices gives the full description of the overlaps between the attacker and the first party and between the parties themselves. The mutual dynamics of the two parties and the attacker depends on the joint probability distribution of  $8 \times 8 \times 8$  IRs, and upon the corresponding updates of the six matrices. The full description of the discrete time evolution of the matrices will be given elsewhere [9].

The analytical solution of the dynamics of the attacker indicates that a full learning is achieved in a finite number of steps,  $t_{\text{learn}}$ , where a full learning is defined such that  $\bar{p}^{A,o} > c_l$ . In table 1  $t_{\text{learn}}$  and  $t_{\text{synch}}$  are compared for various  $L$ .

For  $L = 1$  the average learning time is about twice the synchronization time, and one may reach the wrong conclusion that the synchronization process always terminates before the learning process. In figure 1 we present the histogram of  $t_{\text{synch}}$  and  $t_{\text{learn}}$ , and a fairly good fit between analytical and simulation results is apparent. The two distributions,  $P(t_{\text{synch}})$ ,  $P(t_{\text{learn}})$  have a finite overlap, indicating that in a finite fraction of the runs the learning process terminates before the achievement of synchronization (which was indeed observed in the simulations). Hence the construction with  $L = 1$  is not a good candidate to build a secure channel.

For  $L \geq 3$  the ratio  $r = t_{\text{learn}}/t_{\text{synch}}$  averaged over the runs was found to be  $r \gg 1$  (see table 1). For  $L = 3$ , we did not observe, in simulations over  $10^5$  runs, a case where  $t_{\text{learn}} < t_{\text{synch}}$ . In figure 2 we present the histogram of the probabilities of the ratio,  $r$ , as was found by averaging over different runs of the analytical equations. The minimal value of the ratio was  $r \sim 6$  where the largest ratio was  $r \sim 680$ . We found that the largest  $t_{\text{synch}} < 1000$  whereas the typical learning time is  $4.5 \times 10^4$ .

Synchronization in the case of PMs with continuous weights is achievable only with the following modifications. (a) Spherical normalization,  $\sum_{j=1}^N W_{ji}^2 = N$ , of the weight-vectors belonging to each one of the hidden units after every updating step [6]. (b) The change in the strength of each weight is  $\eta/N$ , where  $\eta$  is a constant of order 1. The synchronization time is proportional to  $N$ , and therefore the analytical description of the system is given by a coupled differential equation. Some limited results and a brief description of the method are presented below, whereas detailed results will be given elsewhere [9].



**Figure 2.** The distribution of  $r = t_{\text{learn}}/t_{\text{sync}}$  for  $L = 3$  obtained from the analytical solution of about 1200 runs. The lowest value obtained for  $r$  was  $\sim 6$ . Inset: the average overlaps  $\bar{\rho}^{A,B}$  (solid line) and  $\bar{\rho}^{A,o}$  (dashed line) as a function of  $\alpha$  for PMs with continuous weights and  $\eta = 3$  are presented. Symbols stand for simulation results with  $N = 5000$  and error bars are smaller than the symbols.

Updating of weights of the first party is given by

$$\mathbf{W}_i^{A+} = \frac{\mathbf{W}_i^A + \frac{\eta}{N} \mathbf{X}_i \theta(-\sigma^A \sigma^B) \theta(\sigma^A \tau_i^A) \sigma^B}{\left| \mathbf{W}_i^A + \frac{\eta}{N} \mathbf{X}_i \theta(-\sigma^A \sigma^B) \theta(\sigma^A \tau_i^A) \sigma^B \right|} \quad (4)$$

and similarly the updating rules for the second party and the attacker. The analytical calculation can be simplified in the continuous case by the probability that there is a mismatch between the two PMs given that there is a mismatch between two hidden units,  $P_1^i \equiv P(\sigma^A \neq \sigma^B | \tau_i^A \neq \tau_i^B) = \epsilon_p^j \epsilon_p^k + (1 - \epsilon_p^j)(1 - \epsilon_p^k)$ . One can map the mutual process onto that of perceptrons, where the updating of the first party is given by

$$\mathbf{W}_i^{A+} = \left( \mathbf{W}_i^A + \frac{\eta}{N} \mathbf{X}_i \tau^B \Delta_i^A \right) / \left| \mathbf{W}_i^A + \frac{\eta}{N} \mathbf{X}_i \tau^B \Delta_i^A \right| \quad (5)$$

and similarly for the second party, where  $\Delta_i^A = \theta(-\tau_i^A \tau_i^B) \theta(\frac{P_1^i}{2} - p_a) + \theta(\tau_i^A \tau_i^B) \theta(1 - P_1^i - p_b) \theta(\frac{1}{2} - p_c)$ , and  $p_a, p_b, p_c$  are the auxiliary variables.

The next step consists of the averages over the following two quantities. (a) Averaging over the joint probability distributions of the local fields of the two parties. (b) Average over the auxiliary variables, which is unique to the case of mutual learning. The normalized overlap,  $\rho$ , between weight-vectors belonging to each pair of hidden units is found to obey the equation,  $d\rho/d\alpha = \eta[C^2 + (1 - C)^2][(1 - \rho)/\sqrt{2\pi} - \eta C/2](1 + \rho) - 2\eta(1 - \rho^2)C(1 - C)/\sqrt{2\pi} - \eta^2 \rho C(1 - C)^2$ , where  $C = \cos^{-1} \rho/\pi$ . For  $\eta < \eta_c \sim 2.68$  the points  $\rho = \pm 1$  are repulsive fixed points of the above equation, where for  $\eta > \eta_c$ ,  $\rho = -1$  is an attractive fixed point.

The equation of motion of the overlap of an attacker with the first party after synchronization, i.e.  $\rho^{A,B} = -1, \rho^{A,o} = -\rho^{B,o}$ , is given by  $d\rho^{A,o}/d\alpha = \eta^2(1 - \cos^{-1} \rho^{A,o}/\pi - \rho^{A,o})/2$ . The fixed point of this equation is  $\rho^{A,o} = -\rho^{B,o} \sim 0.79$  and is independent of  $\eta$ , indicating that perfect learning is not achievable. Analytical results derived from the last two equations with  $\eta = 3$  are presented in the inset of figure 2 and are in good agreement with simulation with  $N = 5000$  and 20 runs.

Finally, we note that the robustness of the presented cryptosystem to other possible attacks and the existence of a practical secure channel based on a public protocol for the synchronization of the parties are both in question.

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